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Dialectique et réfutation ne concernent pas le soin de l’âme chez Aristote, mais 
sans doute vaut-il mieux réserver la pratique de l’elenchos aux membres de l’école – 
ce que Platon suggérait déjà dans la République. S’il y a bien une continuité entre 
Socrate et Aristote, la démoralisation aristotélicienne de la réfutation signifie que 
pratiquer l’elenchos n’a plus aucun rapport avec l’examen de vie. Or, la déperson-
nalisation de la dialectique est déjà à l’œuvre dans certains dialogues de Platon 
(République, Théétète, Sophiste, Philèbe, Parménide). Ainsi chez Platon, deux 
conceptions de la dialectique sont présentes et en concurrence. Aristote a très tôt 
rejeté pour sa part la dimention et le but éthiques de la dialectique socratico-plato-
nicienne. 
L’elenchos véritable est selon R. Bolton la réfutation peirastique des Réfutations 
sophistiques en ce qu’elle montre que la conviction particulière de celui qui est 
interrogé est en conflit avec des vérités communes. Aristote rejette l’idée selon 
laquelle la mise en contradiction établit l’ignorance. L’elenchos peirastique établit 
ainsi la fausseté d’une croyance par rapport à un ensemble d’autres. Or ce qui im-
porte est le degré d’endoxicalité des convictions. 
Dans le dernier chapitre, W. Kullman montre comment Aristote s’est progres-
sivement détourné de la dialectique platonicienne en abandonnant la troisième 
fonction de la dialectique telle qu’elle est caractérisée dans les Topiques, à savoir la 
recherche des principes des sciences. Cet abandon est lié à ce que les Analytiques 
présentent comme une nouvelle procédure d’appréhension des principes, à savoir 
la perception, l’induction et l’expérience – à l’œuvre dans les écrits biologiques. La 
thèse de W. Kullman est convaincante concernant les écrits biologiques, mais ses 
affirmations, selon lesquelles les endoxa ne jouent aucun rôle dans le domaine de 
l’éthique et de la politique, résistent difficilement à la lecture des textes aristo-
téliciens – par exemple le livre I de l’Éthique à Nicomaque qui, pour définir le 
bonheur, va opérer tout un mouvement d’examen des endoxa sur l’eudaimonia 
avant d’en venir à la définition du bonheur à partir de l’ergon de l’homme, 
conformément à ce qu’Aristote énonce au début du livre VII (1145b2-7). 
L’unité de ce livre est assurément le débat dialectique tel qu’il a été inauguré 
par Socrate et formalisé par Aristote. Et si d’un article à l’autre des thèses dif-
férentes, voire contradictoires peuvent être soutenues, tout friand de dialectique 
ancienne y trouvera de quoi se régaler. 
Juliette LEMAIRE 
Centre Léon Robin, CNRS/Paris-Sorbonne/ENS Ulm 
Kurt LAMPE, The Birth of Hedonism. The Cyrenaic philosophers and Pleasure as 
a way of life, Princeton University Press 2015, XVII +277 p. ISBN: 978-
0691161136 (hardback; available also as an e-book)  
The monograph by Kurt Lampe is the first systematic attempt in any modern 
language to deal with the ethics of the Cyrenaics, in particular with their he-
donism. The book offers a detailed reconstruction of the ethical doctrines of both 
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the Cyrenaics of the first generation (such as Aristippus the Elder, his daughter 
Arete, her son Aristippus the Younger) and the Cyrenaics of the later sects (such as 
Anniceris, Hegesias, Theodorus the Godless). After dealing with mainstream and 
later Cyrenaics, Lampe adds a chapter on the later reception of Cyrenaicism by 
Walter Pater, the nineteenth-century Oxford academic and novelist, thus making 
a case for the lively influence that Cyrenaic views had on subsequent hedonism. 
The book concludes with two very useful appendices, one dealing with the main 
sources on the Cyrenaics, the other discussing in details the most extended quota-
tion on Cyrenaic doctrines we have, that is, Diogenes Laertius (II 86-93). For 
breadth of investigation, historical sensitivity and genealogical reconstruction, the 
book by Lampe represents an extremely valuable addition to the growing body of 
Cyrenaic scholarship. 
Since the publication of Voula Tsouna’s monograph on Cyrenaic epistemology 
in 1998 (The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School, Cambridge, CUP), the Cyre-
naics have continued to attract the attention of scholars, mainly in light of the 
philosophical appeal their views have on us. Recent years have witnessed the 
appearance of contributions (by, among others, Tim O’Keefe, James Warren, 
Christopher Rowe and, si parva licet, myself) dealing with all the most significant 
aspects of the philosophy of the Cyrenaics: their epistemological scepticism, the 
aprudentialism inherent to their ethics, the historical and conceptual linkage 
between their doctrines and the ones developed by the subtler thinkers in Plato’s 
Theaetetus, the behaviourism implicit in their philosophy of language, the original 
metaphysical approach (or lack thereof) they seem to adopt (See e.g. T. O’Keefe, 
“The Cyrenaics vs. the Pyrrhonists on Knowledge of Appearances”, in D. Machuca 
(ed.), Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism, Leiden, Brill, 2011, 27-40; Id. “The Sources 
and Scope of Cyrenaic Scepticism”, in U. Zilioli (ed.), From the Socratics to the 
Socratic schools, London, Routledge, 2015, 99-113; J. Warren, “Epicurus and the 
Pleasures of the Future”, OSAP 21 [2001], 135-79; Id. “Cyrenaics”, in J. Warren & 
F. Sheffield (eds), The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, London, 
Routledge, 2014, 409-22; C. Rowe, “The first-Generation Socratics and the 
Socratic Schools: the Case of the Cyrenaics”, in U. Zilioli (ed.), op. cit. 26-42; 
U. Zilioli, The Cyrenaics, London, Routledge, 2014; Id. “The Cyrenaics as 
Metaphysical Indeterminists”, in U. Zilioli (ed.), op. cit. 114-132). But no exhaus-
tive reconstruction of Cyrenaic hedonism has ever been attempted by anyone so 
far. The pioneering book by Lampe fills this gap. As he himself claims, “this 
volume therefore aims to be a complement to Voula Tsouna’s monograph on 
Cyrenaic Epistemology, which is the most thorough investigation of Cyrenaic scep-
ticism, and to help make a fuller appreciation of this ‘original hedonism’ available 
to classicists, philosophers, and cultural historians” (p. 3). 
Lampe’s monograph on Cyrenaic ethics could indeed be read as a proper com-
plement to Tsouna’s study. Differently from Tsouna, however, Lampe’s book has 
no overarching argument to be taken as the main thesis the monograph has to 
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offer to the scholarly debate. The monograph in fact reconstructs the ethical views 
of the Cyrenaics as these were variously developed by the different members of the 
school, without identifying a key philosophical concept subsuming all those views 
under the same pivotal idea (not even ‘pleasure’ or ‘hedonism’ do this work in 
Lampe’s book, at least as far as I can tell). While Tsouna is ‘analytical’ in trying to 
sort out the main views and arguments around which the Cyrenaics constructed 
their doctrines, Lampe owes more to the ‘continental’ idea that the views held by a 
group of philosophers (or, for that matter, by a single philosopher) have to be 
understood by fully appreciating the historical context in which that group lived 
and worked. (In this Lampe is very sensitive to Michel Foucault’s revelatory 
approach to ancient philosophy). With this remark, I do not wish to argue that 
one of the two approaches—either the analytical or the continental, to use two 
consumed labels that still retain some meaning to us—is right and the other 
wrong, or that adopting one of the two approaches means to be lacking either 
historical sensitivity or philosophical perspicuity. It is a matter of emphasis more 
than lack, and Lampe’s emphasis is on the historical and genealogical side, more 
than on the exquisitely theoretical one. 
Since Lampe’s book does not have an overarching thesis, in this review I will 
provide a brief description of the main content of each chapter, such description 
being intertwined with critical remarks I offer as evidence of the stimulating effect 
that Lampe’s book has on the mind of the interested reader. 
The book has ten chapters and two appendices. In the Introduction, Lampe 
sums up the main contents of the book and sets out the methodology he adopts 
“to offer a robust and historically sensitive interpretation of Cyrenaic ethics as it 
functioned in Ancient Greece. Building up this historicized interpretation will oc-
cupy me for most of this book” (p. 7). At the same time, Lampe proposes to take a 
broader view of his historical approach by understanding Cyrenaic ethics “not as a 
set of beliefs and practices confined to a particular time and place, but as a frame-
work for thinking and acting that can be filled out in different ways in different 
times and places” (ibid.). What Lampe does not aim to do is to defend the Cyre-
naics and their views from their critics (see p. 8). By relying on Pierre Hadot’s 
analysis, another important feature Lampe sees as deeply rooted into Cyrenaic 
thinking is the mixture of practices and doctrines that, according to him, are 
characteristic of the ethical approach of the Cyrenaics. As Lampe puts it: “we 
should be extremely sceptical that any Cyrenaic ever adheres to a significant ethical 
position because of the force of reasoning alone. The core positions of each school 
frame an existential option which is chosen for its positive features, i.e., the 
satisfying fit between the world it discloses and the inarticulate aspirations of his 
followers” (7).  
In the second chapter (“Cyrene and the Cyrenaics: a historical and biogra-
phical overview”), Lampe offers a rather useful historical overview of the rich and 
flourishing city of Cyrene between the fifth century BC to the third century BC. 
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In doing so, he fills in an important historical gap that proved to be particularly 
awkward for scholars, who before Lampe had to read the very informative but 
lengthy accounts of Chamoux, Laronde (in French) or even Thrige (in Latin). The 
overview of the history of Cyrene is integrated with biographical accounts of all 
the main philosophers who were held in antiquity to be Cyrenaic, from Aristippus 
the Elder, Arete and Aristippus the Younger, to Anniceris, Hegesias and 
Theodorus the Godless, including lesser-known members of the school, such as 
Aristoteles, Aristoxenus, Antipater, Epiteme, Parabetes, Aithops and Dionysius. 
Except for the two latter ones (one from Ptolemais, the other from Heraclea), all 
the members of the Cyrenaic school were originally from Cyrene. This may be 
good evidence that the Cyrenaic school had its main philosophical centre exactly 
in Cyrene. As Lampe remarks, it is wise to bear in mind that, alongside with the 
more influential schools of Plato and Aristotle, the Cyrenaics were an active group 
of thinkers who gained the philosophical scene just after the death of Socrates.  
Chapters three (“Knowledge and Pleasure”) is one of the chapters I have read 
with much interest, and the one on which I have more doubts. The main bulk of it 
deals with the epistemological foundation of Cyrenaic ethics. Lampe rightly reco-
gnizes that Cyrenaic epistemology provides the theoretical foundation within 
which the Cyrenaics constructed their ethics of pleasure and pain (p. 27). On two 
important aspects of Cyrenaic epistemology, I have found Lampe’s analysis in need 
of further elaboration.  
The kernel of Cyrenaic epistemology lies in the notion of ‘pathos’, which 
Lampe translates as ‘experience’. The Cyrenaics appear to posit an epistemological 
gulf between the experiences we have and what causes them: we incorrigibly and 
unmistakably know our experiences (that is, that I taste as sweet the honey I am 
eating at the moment), while we cannot infer anything about the very cause of our 
experiences (that is, that the honey I am eating is really sweet). When they claim 
that we cannot really know the causes of our experiences, however, do the Cyre-
naics think that I cannot know whether the honey I am eating is really sweet (as 
just suggested) or, more essentially, whether what causes an experience of sweet-
ness in me is actually honey? That is, is the epistemological scepticism of the Cyre-
naics about the epistemological properties of the honey, as Lampe in this study, 
Tsouna 1998 and Warren 2014suggest? Or is it about the identity of the honey as 
a particular object (O’Keefe 2015)? Or, even more radically, is such scepticism 
about the fact that there may be no actual reality for us to discover there (Zilioli 
2015)? To dig deeper into such questions would have helped the reader to get a 
firmer grasp of some central aspects of the philosophy of the Cyrenaics, that is, of 
aspects that may have shed further light on their ethics too (especially when 
Lampe considers the ‘experiences’ (pathe) as the basis for the Cyrenaic theory of 
action, i.e. as the guides through which the Cyrenaics decide what actions are to be 
taken or avoided, p. 45 ff.). 
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Another point that I think would have deserved more attention concerns the 
idea that the Cyrenaics could have accommodated within their epistemology a 
kind of second-order beliefs about ‘experiences’. The thought that, in addition to 
(or building upon) ‘experiences’, Cyrenaic epistemology contemplates the role of 
second-order judgements provides us with an important revision of our under-
standing of that original and inspiring epistemology. Lampe sees the point and 
tackles it at pages 49-52, when he mainly discusses passages from Diogenes Laer-
tius about Hegesias and his followers, and a relevant passage by Athenaeus. Yet, I 
find his overall discussion of this topic unsatisfactory, since it does not spell out 
clearly the main conceptual linkage he sees as operating between Cyrenaic ‘ex-
periences’, ‘appearances’ and ‘reasons’. Again, a more throughout analysis of this 
neglected part of Cyrenaic epistemology would have helped Lampe to provide a 
stronger basis for his claim that, in addition to pleasure, the Cyrenaics also had an 
ethics of virtue and that they valued such things as wealth, friendship, and 
education, and so on (that is, the sort of topics he discusses in chapters 4 to 6). The 
chapter ends with an illuminating discussion of the Cyrenaic concept of telos, 
understood both as the goal of one’s life and as “the fullest, highest, most complete 
expression of whatever attributes the adjectives ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘neither good nor 
bad’ connote” (p. 53).  
Chapters 4 to 6 deal very closely with the Cyrenaic ethics of virtue, with edu-
cation and with happiness. In the first part of chapter 4 (“Virtue and Living Plea-
santly”) Lampe provides a detailed overview of Aristippus the Elder’s concern for 
education and virtue, showing us how he cared for his entire life despite the 
emphasis he appears to have put on the experiences of the present. One of the 
main features of Cyrenaic ‘experiences’ is in fact that they are short-lived: for a 
Cyrenaic it is difficult to account both for what has already been and for what is 
just about to be. Cyrenaic presentism thus seems to trap the Cyrenaics into quite a 
serious ethical problem: how could they motivate a concern for their entire lives 
and for happiness if they relied exclusively on the perishing experiences of the pre-
sent, among which pleasure ranks as the supreme one? Lampe provides two 
different yet overlapping answers to this question, one for Aristippus the Elder, 
another for mainstream and later Cyrenaics (who are fully dealt with in the second 
part of chapter 4). Aristippus’ presentism is a sort of ‘spiritual exercise’ aimed “to 
reduce your anxiety, increase your sensitivity to pleasure, and sharpen your focus 
on making the best possible use of available resources” (p. 92). Similarly, the pre-
sentism of mainstream Cyrenaics has to be taken as a prudential rule of thumb: 
“the Cyrenaics advise against investing too much energy in planning for the future, 
preferring to follow Aristippus’s example and trust their ability to adapt to 
whatever happens” (p. 92). Even Anniceris, whose re-formulation of the concept 
of telos may have well made him a full-blown anti-eudaimonist, is understood as 
caring for long-terms goals such as happiness (p. 88-91).  
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Against much of current scholarship, with such answers Lampe reconciles 
Cyrenaic hedonism with eudaimonism and with an overall concern for long-term 
goals. If chapter 4 is the pars construens of Lampe’s account to explain the Cyrenaic 
interest for happiness and long-term values, the brief chapter 5 (“Eudaimonism 
and anti-eudaimonism”) is the pars destruens: here Lampe scrutinizes and rejects 
all the main explanations on whose basis the Cyrenaics are best understood as anti-
eudaimonists and as not-caring for happiness (among such explanations there are 
those provided by Terry Irwin, Tim O’Keefe, James Warren and Fred Feldman). 
Chapter 6 (“Personal and Political relationships”) is to be read in strict con-
junction with chapter 4: Lampe shows how the concern for one’s life intended as 
an entire, not-evanescing episode and for happiness makes the Cyrenaics inter-
ested in such values as friendship (the main topic of the chapter), benefaction, 
gratitude, enmity, patriotism, participation in political life. Lampe explores how 
these values were variously adopted and defended by Aristippus, mainstream 
Cyrenaics, Hegesias, Theodorus and Anniceris (pages 115-119 contain an excel-
lent analysis of Anniceris’ own position on friendship, as well as of the reasons for 
which his views may be taken as a substantial improvement of mainstream Cyren-
aicism).  
While I have learned much by reading chapters 4 to 6, I also had an immediate 
reaction of mild surprise in seeing how Lampe accommodates happiness into the 
context of Cyrenaic hedonism. I am in full agreement with him in thinking the 
kind of hedonism as endorsed by the Cyrenaics to be perfectly compatible with a 
sort of eudaimonism. Yet, if one is genuinely a hedonist—and, as Lampe argues, 
the Cyrenaics were surely the first serious hedonists in the tradition of Western 
thought—one will have to conceive of happiness as a quite secondary, derivative 
aim in one’s practical life. The ethical focus in the life of the hedonist is on plea-
sure, not on happiness. Given the sort of hedonism they appear to have endorsed, 
for the Cyrenaics the kind of pleasure that is the main focus of their ethical theory 
is actually the short-lived, unitemporal pleasure of the moment. The full accep-
tance of happiness into their ethics, therefore, has to be explained in light of the 
emphasis the Cyrenaics placed on pleasure. Lampe’s own explanation seems to put 
both pleasure and happiness on almost the same level of importance in Cyrenaic 
ethics. Although he sees pleasure implicitly or explicitly always brought in in the 
way the Cyrenaics may have conceived of happiness, the explanation Lampe gives 
us to account for the concern the Cyrenaics showed for long-term values such as 
friendship, benefaction and so on becomes susceptible to be further reduced into 
an explanation leading us to embrace a theory that, at the end, will put happiness 
at its roots, not pleasure.  
If this is so, the Cyrenaics will be understood as less straightforward hedonists 
than originally argued for in Lampe’s book. But here I must confess that my own 
view on Cyrenaic eudaimonism (which I have developed to some extent in chapter 
seven of The Cyrenaics) may have prevented me from fully appreciating Lampe’s 
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own way to come to terms with the reasons why the Cyrenaics were hedonists with 
a concern for happiness. As Terry Irwin does (to refer to one of the scholarly ac-
counts Lampe closely scrutinizes in chapter 5), one may well suggest that the 
Cyrenaics lacked a concept of the self as a stable and unitary item. Since they 
lacked that concept, their ethics cannot account for happiness, which itself re-
quires a stable subject to be fully appreciated and enjoyed (this is, very roughly, 
Irwin’s explanation of the Cyrenaics’ rejection of happiness). The Cyrenaics seem 
not to have had an idea of the self either as a stable and unitary item (as Lampe’s 
analysis seems to imply) or as something that is actually existent (see Irwin’s 
analysis). But, if the Cyrenaics conceived of the self as a kind of loose entity that, à 
la Parfit, could account for psychological connectedness without offering any sort 
of personal continuity over time, one would be able to explain satisfactorily the 
interest the Cyrenaics showed for happiness while retaining the core of their ori-
ginal and fascinating hedonism.  
Chapters 7 and 8 are Lampe at his best. In chapter 7 (“Hegesias’s pessimism”), 
he discusses Hegesias, while in chapter 8 (“Theodorus’s innovations”) he deals 
with Theodorus the Godless. Both chapters are very welcome in so far as they both 
provide the first systematic attempt to deal with the views of these two shadowy 
figures of Cyrenaic thinkers. Shadowy how they may be, both Hegesias and Theo-
dorus proved to be highly original philosophers in their own right and were highly 
regarded in antiquity. In chapter 7 Lampe focuses on Hegesias’ pessimism by 
showing how it almost naturally grows out from the cornerstones of his ethics: 
indifference, magnanimity and autonomy. At the end, Hegesias’ pessimism is de-
picted as a coherent and satisfactory theory of wisdom, a theory that Lampe sees as 
“more consistent than that of Socrates” (p. 146).  
Theodorus the Godless was the most original thinker of the later Cyrenaic 
school. In his magisterial treatment of him, Lampe deals closely with the in-
novations he introduced into Cyrenaic philosophy: in Theodorus’ opinion, joy 
and distress are to be taken as the ends of life; bodily pleasure and pain now 
become ‘intermediates’. In addition, Theodorus was seriously interested in an 
ethics of virtues. Although he was by far the most revisionary among all the 
Cyrenaic philosophers, the view of wisdom he advocated has strong similarities 
with that of Aristippus: the wise man is the ethical measure of what has to be done 
or avoided. Theodorus’ atheism is to be understood exactly in light of this 
conception of wisdom: together with other polemics, Theodorus uses his atheism 
to repudiate the consolidated system of positive laws and systematic ethics in 
which we all, more or less, live. The only criticism I have to level in this chapter is 
that Lampe does not make enough of the concept of ‘indifference’, which with 
‘self-sufficiency’ he sees as central to Theodorus’ thought. By trying a more positive 
approach towards Pyrrho’s possible influence on Theodorus, as well as by relying 
less critically on Aldo Brancacci’s pioneering article on indifference and 
indeterminacy (“Teodoro l’Ateo e Bione di Boristene fra Pirrone e Arcesilao”, 
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Elenchos 3 [1982], 55-85), Lampe could have provided a stronger philosophical 
outlook for some of the views he attributes to Theodorus (and to Hegesias too).  
After having surveyed ancient Cyrenaicism, Lampe adds a chapter on the 
appropriation of Cyrenaicism on the part of Walter Pater (chapter 9: “The New 
Cyrenaicism of Walter Pater”), thus preferring to deal with the lively influence 
that Cyrenaicism had on subsequent hedonism than to focus on the ancient 
debate on the topic of pleasure, namely the debate between Epicureans and Cyre-
naics (especially later Cyrenaics). The book ends with a brief conclusion (“Con-
clusion: the birth of hedonism”) and two very instructive appendices, one provi-
ding a detailed account of all the main sources on the Cyrenaics and their thought 
(“Appendix 1: the Sources”), the other discussing a crucial passage in Diogenes 
Laertius (II 86-93), a passage where Lampe sees an Annicerean interpolation at 
work (“Appendix 2: Annicerean Interpolation in D.L. 2.86-93”). A lengthy biblio-
graphy and an index are also added.  
Again, the book deserves to be widely read and is an extremely welcome 
addition to modern treatments of ancient hedonism. Even when you do not agree 
with it, Lampe’s study works as a stimulus to re-work your own ideas in light of his 
exhaustive and refreshing handling of Cyrenaic ethics. 
Ugo ZILIOLI 
Université de Durham 
B. COLLETTE-DUČIĆ et S. DELCOMMINETTE (éd.), Unité et origine des vertus 
dans la philosophie ancienne, Bruxelles, Ousia, 2014 (Cahiers de philosophie 
ancienne), 478 p. ISBN 978-2-87060-171-6 
Ce volume propose de retracer l’histoire des questions relatives à la théorie de 
l’unité et de l’origine des vertus dans la philosophie ancienne. Réunissant, pour la 
plupart, les contributions présentées lors d’un colloque organisé à l’Université libre 
de Bruxelles par le Groupe de philosophie ancienne du Centre de Philosophie, les 
24 et 25 mars 2011, l’ouvrage, par l’ampleur de la période qu’il couvre, constitue 
une entreprise jusque-là inédite. Il propose une lecture qui ne prétend pas à l’ex-
haustivité, mais qui cherche « à fournir un panorama relativement complet des 
manières dont cette question a été abordée au cours d’une période déterminée de 
l’histoire, en couvrant la plupart des épisodes charnières de l’évolution de son trai-
tement » (p. 17).  
L’ouvrage s’ouvre sur un article de L.-A. Dorion, « L’introuvable unité des ver-
tus dans les Mémorables de Xénophon » (p. 19-38), qui montre qu’on ne trouve 
chez le Socrate de Xénophon aucun équivalent des paradoxes dits de l’unité des 
vertus ou de la vertu-science. Toutes les vertus sont des formes de sophia, mais 
celle-ci se décline en autant de domaines de compétence susceptibles d’être connus. 
Il n’y a donc pas d’unité de la vertu chez Xénophon, car il n’y a pas d’unité de la 
sophia.  
